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This paper presents a spatial utility model of support for multiple political 
parties. The model includes a “valence” term, which I reparameterize to include 
both party competence and the voters’ key sociodemographic concerns. The paper 
shows how this spatial utility model can be interpreted as a hierarchical model 
using data from the 2009 European Elections Study. I estimate this model via 
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) using a block Gibbs sampler and show 
that the model can capture broad European-wide trends while allowing for 
significant amounts of heterogeneity. This approach, however, which assumes a 
normal dependent variable, is only able to partially reproduce the data generating 
process. I show that the data generating process can be reproduced more accurately 
with an ordered probit model. Finally, I discuss trade-offs between parsimony and 
descriptive richness and other practical challenges that may be encountered when 
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building models of party support and make recommendations for capturing the best 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This paper presents a spatial utility model of support for multiple political 
parties. The model includes a “valence” term, which I reparameterize to include 
both party competence and the voter’s key sociodemographic concerns. The paper 
uses data from the 2009 European Elections Study to show how this spatial utility 
model can be interpreted as a hierarchical model using (European Elections Study, 
2013). I estimate this model via Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) using 
a block Gibbs sampler and show that the model can capture broad European-wide 
trends while allowing for significant amounts of heterogeneity. The findings suggest 
that ideology and interests usually have a larger effect than party competence but 
that the latter cannot be discounted in competitive environments. This approach, 
however, which assumes a normal dependent variable, is only able to partially 
reproduce the data generating process. This happens because of the high frequency 
with which voters report there is little to no chance that they will vote for the party 
in question. I show that the data generating process can be reproduced more 
accurately with an ordered probit model. Finally, I discuss practical challenges and 
trade-offs between parsimony and descriptive richness that may be encountered 
when building models of party support and make recommendations for capturing 
the best of both approaches.  
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Chapter Two: Theory 
 The model presented in this paper draws from existing spatial theory that 
holds that one’s ideological proximity to a candidate or a party is a major 
determinant of one’s propensity to vote for that candidate or party.1 The spatial 
utility model is as follows: each voter has a         utility vector,  , which captures 
the distance between her ideal point,   , and each party’s position,   , in k-
dimensional space. In this paper, k = 2, with one dimension that runs from (the 
political) left to right and another dimension for position on European Union 
integration.  
The model assumes that the dimensions of the policy space are orthogonal, 
which implies that there is zero correlation between the dimensions. Orthogonal 
dimensions can be obtained via principal components analysis which rotates the 
observed data (Johnston, 1984, p. 536ff). However, since the sample correlation 
between respondent’s left-right and EU ideal points is only 0.0145, for the purposes 
of this analysis, it will be assumed that the dimensions are in fact orthogonal.2 When 
the axes are orthogonal, the shortest distance between the voter’s ideal points and 
each party’s position can be obtained using the Pythagorean Theorem. If    (
   
   
) 
                                                 
1 For an introduction, see, for example, Hinich and Munger (1997). 
2 Another approach is to perform a two stage estimation, where the first stage is an ideal point model 
of both the parties and the individuals. However, as Jessee (2010, 332) notes, this produces noisy 
estimates even with 10 policy positions, and since only 2 are used here, I decided to leave the 
dimensions unchanged.  
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and    (
   
   
), then subtracting    from each vector centers the ideal point at the 
origin and yields expressions for each side of a right triangle: 
 
Figure 1: Spatial Distance between Voter i and Party j 
 
The (two-dimensional) Euclidean distance, also known as the norm of the two 
vectors, is  
‖     ‖  √(     )
 
(     )  √(       )
 




Distance can be connected to utility by adding a slope coefficient,  , such that 
   (  ,   )    ‖     ‖
 
.   captures the effect of squared distance on utility and is 
assumed to be negative so that utility is an increasing function of – .3 The slope 
coefficient captures the importance of ideological distance and the fact that 
ideological distance and utility may not be measured in the same units. Put 
differently, the farther a voter is from any given party, in terms of ideological 
                                                 
3 That is, 
    (  ,  )
 ‖     ‖
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distance, the less likely he is to support that party because supporting that party 
would give her less utility (than supporting a party she is closer to). 
This paper adopts the “valence” model on the rationale that, in addition to 
ideological proximity, each individual i attaches a particular “valence” to each party j 
(   ), which is the amount of utility that person i gets for party j above and beyond 
that which is captured by the ideological term (Jessee, 2010, p. 328). Schofield 
interprets     as a measure of “competence” (Schofield, 2004, p. 448). Voters may 
feel more inclined to vote for parties that have a chance of getting elected, of making 
a difference in parliament, and so on, and so may not vote for their ideologically 
preferred candidate. As discussed in more detail below, I interpret     widely to 
incorporate interests and identities. A first- or second-generation immigrant, for 
example, may consider himself to be quite conservative—and so appear to be 
ideologically proximate to parties on the right—but would nevertheless be unlikely 
to vote for rightist parties, many of which campaign in Europe today for a tough line 
on immigration.  
In the spatial valence model, the utility function of voter i with respect to 
party j is 
   (  ,   )       ‖     ‖
 
     
 
‖     ‖
 
 is the squared Euclidean distance between the voter’s ideal point and the 
party’s position.     is normally distributed with mean   . Each    has an associated 
stochastic variation term    with mean zero.    has variance   
  and each    is 
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uncorrelated with the others                 . Here an overall intercept,   , is 
included, which centers the distribution of    at 0. The probability that i picks j 
(considered as a function of party positions z) is 
           [   (  ,   )     (  ,    )]         
 
and,   , the expected vote share of party j, is the mean of those probabilities, 
 
 
∑       
 
   .  
Unlike distance, which requires a slope coefficient to be translated into 
utility,     is, by construction, already in utiles. For illustration’s purpose, suppose 
     and     , so that    (  ,   )   ‖     ‖
 
    . A one unit increase in 
distance will lead to a one unit decrease in utility, but this can always be offset by a 
matching increase in party valence. Equivalently, distance    (  ,   )  ‖     ‖
 
 
   . Suppose that two parties, j and j*, are equally far away from the respondent’s 
ideal point in terms of ideological distance but that            . Below, Figure 2 
shows this situation in which the respondent prefers j even though both parties fall 
on the same indifference curve. 
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Figure 2: Spatial Distances with Party Valences 
More generally, in the model without the valence term, distance implies an 
indifference curve: voters are theorized to be indifferent to parties taking positions 
on anywhere on the origin circle that has ‖     ‖
 
 as the hypotenuse since all 
points on that circle have equal utility. However, once valence terms are added, 
voters have an indifference set: they are indifferent to any combination of distance 
and valence that has equal utility (since comparisons are relative, the intercept is 
never relevant). Though in principle infinite solutions are possible, the normal 
distribution of     makes solutions centered around    much more probable. In 
general, given that individual i has a certain valence towards party j,  
 (   (  ,   )|   )        ‖     ‖
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Further, by the Law of Iterated Expectations, 
  (   (  ,   )|   )        ‖     ‖
 
 
   
where    is the mean utility of the population.4 
FROM SPATIAL UTILITY MODEL TO HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION MODEL 
 
 This spatial model can be easily interpreted as a hierarchical model if the 
effect of spatial distance,  ‖     ‖
 
, is considered the ground level of the model 
and party valence,    , is considered as a group level effect. Just as we would expect 
ideology to work relatively consistently across an individual’s evaluation of multiple 
parties, we would expect responses about any given party to share certain 
characteristics. The mean of the distribution of responses about a party reflects its 
popularity, and the variance reflects how polarized the public is about the party. The 
mean of each party valence,   , can then be reparameterized to include predictors. I 
include four individual characteristics here (the sociodemographic variables of 
class, education, migrant background, and European—as opposed to national—
identity). 
                                                 
4 In this case, the heterogeneity introduced by each individual having a valence towards each party 
can be summarized succinctly using the Law of Iterated Expectation, which holds that for any two 
random variables   and  , where   conditions  , the expectation of the conditional expectation is 
equal to the unconditional mean of  :  (      )    .     and    are both random variables but, 
since      (  ,   
 ) and    is distributed normally with mean zero, if we know which party the 
individual is evaluating, we can say  ( (      ))   , which simplifies the model as described above. 
See Casella and Berger (2002, 162ff). 
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 The unit of observation is individual i's evaluation of party j. In a Gaussian 
linear multilevel model, the i,jth observation can be represented as following a 
normal distribution where the structural part of the ground level equation is the 
mean of the distribution: 
 
   (  ,   )  (     ‖     ‖
 
    ,   
 ) 
 
        ,    ,   
           ,   
      ,   
        ,   
       
 
 
     ‖     ‖
 
 can be written as the inner product of a design matrix of 
exogenous observations and a vector of slope coefficients, that is, as    .     can be 
expressed similarly as the inner product of a design matrix of observations on the 
individual,  , and associated slope coefficients for each party,   . This allows the 
model to be written as a longitudinal mixed effects regression model for the ith 
individual where 
               
   is a (      ) vector of propensities and    is the corresponding error term (one 
row for each party).         ,  
     .    is also distributed multivariate normal 
with mean zero and variance convariance matrix D; D is a (5 x 5) matrix since there 
is an intercept in addition to the four sociodemographic predictors (Chib & Carlin, 
1999).  
 One of the assumptions that underlies Bayesian regression is conditional 
independence:    and    contain no additional information about    beyond what is 
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contained in    and the parameters,     , for all     (Jackman, 2009, p. 100). This 
assumption would be violated if the hierarchical nature of the data was not 
modeled. One way to illustrate this violation, following Gelman and Hill (2009, 265), 
the variance covariance matrix,  , can be characterized  
 
   ,   {
  
    
                                                 
  
        ,                                                 
          .
 
 
If no second level predictors are included, as is the case in a basic varying intercept 
in the model, D simplifies to a single variance term,   
 . Otherwise   
  is the 
composite implied by the linear combination of (the normally distributed elements 
of)    and the data,  , which is treated as constant. If   
    (no effect of party 
valences), the structural model simplifies to      ‖     ‖
 
 with homoscedastic, 
non-autocorrelated errors (provided   
  is constant for all observations). Without 
the influence of    , the model becomes similar to that described by Lin, Enelow, and 
Dorussen (1999). 
 More intuitively, the most basic spatial model described at the opening 
assumes the following stylized decision-making process: individuals evaluate one 
party at a time and then later rank them based on their relative utilities. Party 
valences are included on the expectation that they are something of a tie-breaker. 
For example, an ideological leftist would prefer a viable centrist party to an 
ineffectual, but ideologically more proximate, leftist party (but probably not a 
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rightist party, even one that is highly competent). Similarly, sociodemographic 
characteristics are included on the assumption that they contain additional 
information about the ideology and interests of voters that is not captured by 
distance. The model here still reflects the idea that voters determine party utilities 
one at a time and then make their vote choice based upon the resulting ranks. Put 
differently, it is unnecessary to model party utilities endogenously as a function of 
(at least some of) the other party utilities because each individual has an intercept 
towards each party,    , which properly offsets the party ranks.5  
    reflects both strategic and sincere voting. Since E   = 0, if   ̂ > 0, it can be 
taken as evidence that party j is thought to be more competent than the mean party. 
In particular, the party intercept   ,  may be interpreted as party j’s competence, 
and hence strategic support, while the magnitude of   , ,   , ,   , , and   ,  (along 
with    , may be taken as evidence of sincere voting. 
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF HIERARCHICAL MODELS 
Sometimes we can update our beliefs about a probability when we have been 
given additional information (a condition). The conditional probability is the 
probability that both the condition and the event occur divided by the probability of 
the condition. Formally, for two events A and B in a sample space S where P(B) > 0:  
                                                 
5 This would be violated, for example, if voters liked or disliked certain parties for no discernible 
reason other than their attitude towards some other party (that is, party loyalty that could not be 
expressed in terms of ideology or interest). This would also be violated if     depended on some 
interaction of      and      (that is, if fear of the competence of another party and utility towards it 
changed evaluations of other parties in ways not captured by the rest of the model). 
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For example, we can update our beliefs about the probability that it will snow 
tomorrow if we are given conditions about geography and time of year: 
            ,         approaches 0 but                 ,         is quite 
high.  
Bayes’ Rule follows from the definition of the conditional probability. Since 
       
      
    
 but        
      
    
, which implies                   , 
substituting yields        
          
    
, which is Bayes’ Rule. So, for example, 
suppose we are interested in the probability, A, that someone will support the 
Republicans in an election and we know B, whether or not the person registered 
Republican (which, of course, is not the same, as the voter may have registered 
years ago and since changed her preferences . Bayes’ Rule holds 
                                
                                
            
 
If we have information about the prior distribution of GOP support,            ; 
the conditional probability supporters have of registering GOP, 
                     ; as well as the probability about registering in the first 
place,             , then we can make direct inferences about the quantity of 
interest, which is the probability of supporting Republicans given our knowledge of 
party registration (the data),                               . 
` 12 
Bayes’ Rule generalizes allowing for multiple outcomes (Casella & Berger, 
2002, p. 23). If the sample space is partitioned into A1, A2, … and B is any set, then 
for each k   ,  … 
        
            
∑  ( |  )     
 
   
   
So, suppose there were an election in the United Kingdom with only three parties 
running, Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat, and suppose we knew a 
voter’s vote choice and wanted to update our beliefs about, say, utility towards the 
Labour party. Then we would have, for example, 
                 
            
                                        
, where       is the prior 
distribution of utilities towards Labour,         is the conditional probability of 
vote choice given utility towards Labour, and                  is the posterior 
probability distribution of utility given the data about voting behavior. 
 This framework adapts easily to the regression context since the likelihood 
function is a conditional probability function. The likelihood        ∏        
 
    
is, by definition, the joint probability of the data given that the unknown vector of 
parameters,  , is fixed (Casella & Berger, 2002, p. 290). This allows   to take the 
place of A and the likelihood function to take the place of        . Specifically, the 
posterior distribution of an unknown parameter  , given the data  , is equal to its 
prior distribution multiplied by the likelihood divided by the probability of the data 
(the marginal distribution of  ): 
 
       
          




where     ∫             (Casella & Berger, 2002, p. 324). Since     is just a 
constant that ensures that the posterior distribution is a valid probability 
distribution (that integrates to 1), statisticians often stress the proportion 
                 . When there are multiple (say k) unknown parameters, as is 
the case here,   follows a multivariate distribution such that 
           , … ,                    (Jackman, 2009, p. 22). 
 In the case of hierarchical models, such as the one presented here, the prior 
distribution is sometimes interpreted as the second (here party) level of the model. 
This reflects in turn the belief that the (pooled) parameters come from a common 
distribution. The parameters are exchangeable in the sense that, absent other 
information (data), the probability assignment is invariant to the way that the 
parties are labeled. Suppose, for example, in the model described here, there are 
strong class cleavages that are poorly captured. We would expect the variance of the 
effect of class,    (  , ), to be quite high—people would either love or hate each 
and every party, depending on their class statuses. Exchangeability dictates that, 
absent countervailing data, the variance associated with   ,   would be the same 
throughout the EU (Jackman, 2009, p. 45). The distribution of the prior parameter    
(for example   , ) is then modeled to depend (hierarchically) on some 
hyperparameter v: 
       (  | )                                                                             
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In general, hierarchical models are useful for representing complex causal processes 
as a series of relatively simple relationships, that is, representing them in terms of a 
series of distributions that would be known if only the value of its parameters (or at 
least the parameters’ distributions  were known.  
Modeling the distribution of the prior allows the data to be described as 
conditionally exchangeable: if we did not model the systematic ways in which 
people’s responses to parties differ, the data would not be exchangeable 
(independently and identically distributed). However, conditioned on the party 
level parameters, the data can be treated as if exchangeable (and hence at least 
“partially pooled” . In this way, hierarchical models can account for causal 
heterogeneity (Jackman, 2009, p. 45). Put differently, despite the heterogeneity 
introduced by the party valences,    , we can still make inferences about   , the 
general effect of ideological distance.  
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Chapter Three: Data 
This section analyzes party preference in the European Union using the 
European Election Study (EES) that was taken in conjunction with the 2009 
European Parliament elections. This means that this EES studies EU-27: it includes 
the original 15 member states6, the 10 countries7 that joined the EU in 2004, as well 
as Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007, but not Croatia (which did not join 
until July 2013).  
Even though the smallest parties are not asked about, every respondent is 
asked about at least four parties (Malta) and as many as 12 (Spain). The dependent 
variable is not individual attitude but individual affinity towards a particular party. 
There are 27,069 respondents     . This means there are roughly 1,000 
respondents per country and so roughly 1,000 observations per party. The 203 
parties (  ) in the sample are dispersed in such a way so as to translate into 
203,470 observations on the dependent variable (   ).  
The survey also asks respondents to rate both themselves and each of their 
country’s parties  a  in terms of left and right and  b  in terms of whether EU 
integration has gone too far (or not far enough). All ratings are done on an 11 point 
scale (from 0 to 10, inclusive), and these questions are used to measure Euclidean 
distance. ote that the distance measure is “subjective” in the sense that it captures 
the respondent’s perception of the party’s position relative to her own, rather than 
the party’s official stance (or otherwise estimated position). This is appealing in that 
an individual may “feel like” a party is “too conservative” for her without knowing 
                                                 
6 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are the original members that joined in 
1958. Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands joined in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995.  
7 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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exactly how the rest of the public would place the party (or her) in terms of left and 
right. An individual may feel that a party “goes too far” down the road of European 
integration without knowing the particular official stance that the party happens to 
take in the election. Parties may also feel an incentive to dissemble their stances in 
an election, limiting the utility of manifestos. The subjective data used here are, 
however, limited in that such party placements are something of a “black box”—
these estimates offer us a sense of the effects of such perceptions without saying 
why some people have them while others do not. Though it is beyond the scope of 
this paper, I think such perceptions of party position are better modeled separately 
 as a function of official party stance, the individual’s political awareness, and so 
on). 
The second level of the model includes demographic variables—European 
Identity, Education, Class, and Migrant Background—which are modeled as 
variables that explain the respondent’s affinity for each party above or below the 
party’s baseline level of support. European Identity is based on whether the 
respondent identifies as national only, national and European, European and 
national, or European only (Q82). European Identity is considered as an ordinal 
measure. This operationalization is consistent with the findings from Mohanty 
(2012) that viewing such values as a continuum yields stronger predictions than, 
say, having separate, competing variables for the two. 
Missing data is a potential source of bias because, unless the data is missing 
completely at random, which is rarely the case in the social sciences, it introduces 
dependencies into what should be an independently and identically distributed 
sample, thereby limiting the extent to which findings correspond to the population. 
Missing data can be handled by modeling each missing variable as a parameter to be 
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estimated as part of the Gibbs sampler or through multiple imputation. This paper 
adopts the latter approach because one of the key explanatory variables—Euclidean 
distance—depends on four questions (self- and party-placements in terms of 
left/right and EU integration) which do not enter directly into the final model. I 
imputed these using random regression and any other variables with missing data, 
on a country-by-country basis following the technique described by Gelman and Hill 
(2009, p. 529). Random regression balances the available information and the 
inherent noise of the data generating process. Rather than directly estimating the 
missing values, it estimates the parameters of the probability distribution that likely 
would have generated missing items. Results presented here are based on 1,000 
rounds of imputation. For Model 1, variables are centered at their means to facilitate 
convergence (Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 415). 
The dependent variable is how likely each respondent is to vote for any given 
party in his country on a Likert scale of 0 to 10.8 The data are not, however, 
probabilities in the sense that respondents are not required to make their responses 
sum to 1 (or any other constant), so the data do not need to be treated as 
“compositional data.”9  
 Zero is—by far—the modal response for the dependent variable (as Figure 3 
shows). This makes sense because presumably voters on the far left do not seriously 
consider parties on the far right, centrist voters do not seriously consider extreme 
parties, and so on. Approximately 80% of those surveyed responded zero for at least 
                                                 
8 In the United Kingdom, the question was put: “We have a number of parties in Britain each of which 
would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? 
Please specify your views on a scale where   means ‘not at all probable’ and    means ‘very 
probable’.” 
9 For an introduction to this topic, see Aitchison (1986). 
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one party. Despite the relatively large number of categories, the distribution of 
responses still shows the unevenness that marks categorical—rather than 
continuous—data, which is reason to think that an ordinal response model may be 
appropriate.  
 
Figure 3: Histogram of Responses on Dependent Variable.  
 Zero response is not distributed independently of party. As Figure 4 shows, 
some parties have almost no zeros, while others have almost all. One possible 
reason to think that it is unnecessary to model zero inflation is that the excess zeros 
will simply be absorbed into the party intercept. To foreshadow, the Model 1 
estimates do suggest that this adjustment happens to some extent but not strongly 
(the correlation between proportion of zeros at the party level and the party 
intercept is -0.08). This makes sense in that hierarchical estimates are sometimes 
called “shrinkage estimators” because they tend to shrink extreme estimates back 
towards the mean. So, if there is some small party that 80% of voters say that they 
would never vote for, the hierarchical model will still tend to shrink the party 
intercept back towards the mean.  
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Chapter Four: Markov Chain Monte Carlo Estimation 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is extremely useful for performing 
integrations and maximizations that are either analytically impossible or 
computationally infeasible to perform directly. The Monte Carlo principle is that 
“anything we want to know about a random variable   can be learned from 
sampling many times from     , the density of  ” (Jackman, 2009, p. 133). Markov 
Chains are a particular kind of sequential probability structure in which the 
distribution of the present value depends, at most, on the random variable which 
immediately precedes it. Expressed formally, for the sequence of random variables 
  ,   , …. to be a Markov chain, 
             , … ,                      
These distributions are sometimes called “memoryless” because   , … ,      contain 
no additional information about the distribution of     . Under certain regularity 
conditions that are often met when doing statistical inference, a generalization of 
the Law of Large Numbers, known as Ergodic theorem, holds that as    , 
 
 
∑     
 
 
        
provided the expectation exists (Casella & Berger, 2002, p. 270). So, for example, if 
         an g       
 , then, as    , 
 
 









     
           , which is not a sample quantity but the second central population 
moment of the distribution. The Monte Carlo principle cannot be used to make 
` 21 
inferences about the posterior distribution of   when the distribution is unknown 
(which is often the case for posteriors). However, it is possible to start with certain 
known distributions and to transition to the posterior distribution using Markov 
Chains. Gibbs samplers are a popular type of Markov Chain Monte Carlo that sample 
the conditional distributions of a model’s unknown parameters in order to 
completely characterize their posterior distributions (Jackman, 2009, p. 214). And, 
since Markov Chains are memoryless, once the sampler has converged on the 
posterior, it doesn’t matter where it started. Once the distribution has converged, 
inferences can be made simply by specifying the function       and applying it to 
the sequence of random variables generated by the sample. So, if we are interested 
in the chance that the target variable is positive, we can find out what that chance is 
by letting          ,      , an indicator function that takes the value 1 if     > 0 
and 0 otherwise, since 
 
 
∑      
 
  will equal the appropriate proportion.10 
 I estimate the model using MCMChregress.11 The function implements the 
block Gibbs sampler found in Algorithm 2 of Chib and Carlin (1999). This approach 
uses standard, conjugate priors, which means that the posterior distribution belongs 
                                                 
10 This can be done easily with the built in logical functions in R. If we want to know the probability 
that the first parameter is positive, this can be done with the command 
mean(my.model.output$mcmc[ ,1]  > 0) since the comparator will return a Boolean vector which R 
averages as if it were a vector of zeros and ones. 
11MCMChregress is found in the R package MCMCpack (Martin, Quinn, & Park, 2013). I recommend 
this software, which is implemented in C++, over WinBUGS for both speed and ease of use (as it 
doesn’t require a separate file programming the model and is called much like other regression 
functions in R). WinBUGS, however, still has greater flexibility in terms of model design (as 
MCMChregress can handle varying intercepts but cannot handle non-nested models, models with 
multiple levels, and so on). 
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to the same family as the prior (Casella & Berger, 2002, p. 325). Specifically, the 
prior distribution of   is multivariate normal.   
  follows an 
             ( ,
 
 
) prior distribution. The (hyper)prior distribution of  , the 
variance covariance matrix of the party level effects, is                 ,    , 
where r, the degrees of freedom, is the length of   and R is a square scale matrix. 
Block Gibbs samplers are a type of Gibbs sampler that updates certain 
parameters all at once so as to reduce serial correlation. In this case, the slope 
coefficients for both levels of the model, b and , are updated at the same time (Chib 
& Carlin, 1999). Chib and Carlin show that the block update is possible since the 
conditional distribution of   does not depend on b, so once y,   
 , and D are updated, 
  and b can both be updated before moving on to the other parameters. 
ASSESSING CONVERGENCE 
 
The greatest danger when using MCMC is that one might draw inferences 
from a chain that has not converged yet on its target (the posterior distribution of 
the model given the data) (Kass, Carlin, Gelman, & Neal, 1998). To assess 
convergence, I took several steps.  
I estimated three chains, each of which was given different starting values. 
MCMCpack does not permit starting values for group level predictors since these are 
sampled based on the first round of samples. I used OLS estimates for the first chain 
(the software default) and drew from diffuse random normal distributions for the 
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next two. (MCMCpack generally defaults to diffuse priors.) These starting values do 
not have any influence on the final chain, however, as the first 1,000 draws are 
discarded as “burn in.” 
 Autocorrelation is a problem for MCMC methods in general and in particular 
for multilevel models. This is because the group-level correlation often leads to 
autocorrelation in the sample chains. Autocorrelation reduces the amount of unique 
information contained in each sample. It is best to have several thousand 
independent samples for each parameter (or the equivalent) before making 
inferences (Jackman, 2009, p. 251ff). I took 100,000 draws (after the initial burn-in 
of 1,000 draws) for each chain and thinned that sample by a factor of 20 (retaining 
only 5,000 samples per unknown parameter). Thinning does not increase effective 
sample size but reduces storage requirements (which reduces the computational 
burden of posterior calculations).12 
For each chain, I analyzed the Geweke diagnostic13 to confirm that the first 
tenth of the samples (for each parameter) have the same mean as the last half. The 
test statistics should—and do—resemble a standard normal: for each chain, the 
mean is -0.021 and the standard deviation is 0.95. Next, I analyzed the effective 
sample size, which is a measure that discounts the nominal sample size based on the 
degree of autocorrelation. Even after being thinned by a factor of 20, a small amount 
                                                 
12 I may have thinned more than is necessary but not by much—based on early model specifications, 
a thinning factor of at least 16 is necessary (at this number of iterations) to maintain a sufficiently 
large effective size for all parameters (while ultimately storing only 5,000 samples). 
13 I did so using the gelman.diag(),geweke.diag() and n.effective() functions, all of which are found 
in the coda package in R (Plummer, Best, Cowles, Vines, Sarkar, & Almond, 2012). 
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of autocorrelation was still present, but there was fortunately a sufficient sample for 
each parameter: there were a minimum of 3,600 independent samples with a (much 
higher) mean of 4,995 (all figures per parameter per chain).  
 ext, I inspected Gelman and Rubin’s Convergence Diagnostic,  ̂, which is 
used to determine the level of similarity multiple chains have to one another. The 
diagnostic works in a fashion similar to one-factor ANOVA—loosely speaking, by 
analyzing the ratio of within-chain to between-chain variation. It converts the 
variances and covariances of the chains into a single score that approaches 1 (from 
some larger number) as the chains near convergence. This test is more demanding 
than Geweke’s because it is much more likely that two groups happen to have the 
same mean than that they covary in the same fashion—after all, those computations 
involve mean comparisons.  ̂ should be less than 1.1 or 1.2 for all parameters 
(Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004, pp. 294-8). In fact, ̂ is 1 for all 1,044 
parameters in the model, suggesting complete convergence (which explains why the 
other test statistics are identical).  
 Geweke Test Statistics Number of Effective 
Samples 
 ̂ 
 Mean SD Min Mean Max 
Chain 1 -0.021 0.951 3,600 4,995  
Chain 2 -0.021 0.951 3,600 4,995  
Chain 3 -0.021 0.951 3,600 4,995  
(All chains)     1 
 
Table 1: Convergence Measures 
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Finally, the amount of error associated with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
estimation is quite low: both naïve and time-series standard errors are uniformly 
less than 0.005. In sum, there is good reason to believe that the sampler converged. 
The target, however, unfortunately does not closely resemble the distribution of the 
data (as can be seen in Figure 5 below). The large number of zeros in the data shifts 
the posterior to the left, which means that high levels of support are not predicted 
as often as they should be: roughly 24.7% of the data are above 5, whereas only 
14.1% of the posterior predictions are. Worse, 15.0% percent of the data are greater 
than 7, but only 0.5% of the predictions are. Similarly, certain categories (1-4) are 
predicted to have far higher levels than is likely. 
 
Figure 5: Density of Model 1 Predictions vis-à-vis Observations.  
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Chapter Five: Results 
 The posterior distribution contains a wealth of information. This section 
provides a brief overview of the results and illustrations of some types of claims that 
can be evaluated with the posterior. The model is somewhat difficult to summarize 
because it has 1,044 unknown parameters: overall intercept, effect of distance, (203 
parties) * (party intercept + coefficients for 4 sociodemographic variables), and 
variance covariance parameters. Bayes factors provide a method for deciding 
whether or not to include parameters that is quite similar to a Likelihood Ratio test 
(Jackman, 2009, p. 37). I do not adopt this approach since it is entirely possible that 
a particular sociodemographic variable would influence the appeal of some parties 
but not others (or in some places but not in others) and so be substantively 
important without providing definite evidence that the variable must be included. 
The model should be able to identify when a variable is important and when it is not 
(and perhaps shed some light on how the model might be improved if a variable is 
only important in a subset of cases).   
Figure 6 provides an example of how the model estimates can be 
summarized graphically by focusing on the credible intervals of a subset of the 
parameters of interest.  In this case, 95% Highest Posterior Densities14 (HPDs), 
                                                 
14 Credible intervals differ from confidence intervals since in the former case the parameter is 
considered a random variable. For any given section of the parameter’s support, there is a certain 
chance   (implied by the cumulative proportion of the posterior distribution which is found in that 
region) that the parameter would take that value. For unimodal posteriors, such as the one 
investigated here, the HPD can be written: { :                       (      | )} where 
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which correspond to roughly two standard deviations on either side of the point 
estimate, are provided for Germany. 
 
Figure 6: Highest Posterior Densities (95%) for Party-Level Effects in Germany 
The rank order of the party intercepts   —Christian Democrats (with Christian 
Socialists) placed first, followed by Social Democrats (SPD), followed by Greens 
 with Alliance ’9  , followed by Free Democrat  FDP , followed by a new political 
party called “the Left” —happens to correspond exactly to that of the election 
results. The estimates show that the CDU and their longtime coalition partners, the 
FDP, are more appealing to wealthy voters, while the Left has the clearest working 
class appeal. Despite its origins with union politics, the SDP moved towards the 
center under the leadership of President Gerhard Shroeder, so it is perhaps 
unsurprising that class has relatively little effect on support for the SDP or for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
∫         
      
      
    . (Casella and Berger 2002, 441, 447-8; Jackman 2009, 26). Here, the 
posterior is unimodal, but the data is not, so the credible intervals need to be taken with a large grain 
of salt.  
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Green party, with which it often partners. The results suggest that voters with 
European identities favor parties on the left (SDP, Green, and the Left) while those 
with nationalist identities favor those on the right (CDU, FDP) but that these party 
level effects are relatively small. This suggests in Germany, perhaps, that concerns 
about Europe are well captured as a matter of policy distance and that it may not be 
necessary to model national vs. European identity in addition to a spatial distance 
measure which includes integration policy. The results also suggest that knowing 
the educational background of a voter adds little information about her party 
preference. Those with a migrant background find the Social Democrats the most 
appealing, but the effects of migrant background are particularly noisy (a trend 
discussed further below). 
Below, I present a succinct summary of the model. The summary includes 
point estimates for the parameters of the ground level of the model, variance 
covariance terms, and measures of fit. Standard deviations of the posterior 
(somewhat analogous to standard errors) are also included. As point estimates, as is 
standard, I include the mean of the posterior distribution for each parameter since it 
minimizes expected squared error loss (Jackman 2009, 24, Casella and Berger 2002, 
353). Since distance is on a 0 to 200 scale, which is somewhat difficult to interpret, I 
also provide estimates of the effect per standard deviation of distance and distance’s 
maximum. As an additional measure of uncertainty, I include the proportion of the 
posterior distribution that has the opposite sign of the point prediction. This 
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measure can be thought of as a Bayesian analogue to a one-sided p-value in the 
classical framework (and so is denoted        .15  
For party level intercept and coefficients, I present the mean of several 
quantities of interest (for all 203 parties) for both the effects and associated 
uncertainty. In order to give a sense of the magnitudes, I focus on absolute estimates 
(since party level effects have mean zero). For example, some parties may be 
popular with high income (translating into positive party-level coefficients) and 
others not (translating into negative coefficients), but simply averaging across all 
parties would make it look as if class had no effect on support for any party. 
Estimates are given for a standard deviation of the relevant W variable and for the 
difference between the sample maximum and minimum value of W.  
Deviance Information Criteria (DIC) is an analogue of Aikaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) that is used to evaluate 
multilevel models. Those measures penalize for including too many parameters; 
they are not appropriate for multilevel models because in multilevel models the 
number of parameters in the model varies widely based on which parameters are 
pooled (Gelman & Hill, 2009, pp. 525-7). Since DIC is mainly useful for model 
comparison, which is not done here for models of this class, I also include, as a 
pseudo-R2, the squared correlation between the predictions and the observations. 
                                                 
15 The difference is that a classical p-value measures the odds of observing data that is at least as 
extreme as the data in hand, given the null hypothesis, whereas the Bayesian paradigm treats the 
parameter of interests as a variable and the observed data as fixed. 
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The squared correlation is one readily calculable definition of the classical R2 that is 
asymptotically equivalent to the others (maximization of model sum of squares, 
minimization of residual sum of squares) (Tjur, 2008). Considering the model 
predicts party preferences in 27 countries with only seven explanatory variables, 
counting intercepts, the correlation is fairly robust at 0.4995.  Full results (party-by-
party point estimates with 95% HPDs) are provided in the Appendix. 
 
Table 2: Model Summary 
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As hypothesized, greater spatial distances correspond to lower party utilities. 
(In fact, none of the posterior has the opposite sign.) The slope coefficient is -0.0239 
with a 95% highest posterior density (HPD) interval of (-0.025, -0.022). Since 
placements are initially on a 0 to 10 scale, the maximum possible distance is √    
(making the maximum possible squared distance, to which the slope coefficient 
corresponds, 200). At this maximal distance (which is observed in sample), holding 
other things equal, a person would be predicted to respond 4.78  0.2 units lower 
than someone at zero distance would. 
As hypothesized, party valences are important. The party intercepts,   ̂, have 
a mean absolute effect of about   unit, suggesting that roughly   % of voters’ 
evaluations, averaged across parties, are explained by factors other than ideology 
and sociodemographic affinities. This may not seem like much but, bear in mind, this 
is actually a fairly hard test for party valences: since the European Parliament is an 
historically weak institution, EP elections present an ideal opportunity to vote for 
the ideologically preferred (as opposed to politically viable) party.  
Sociodemographic variables, taken collectively, are very important: voters at 
opposite ends of all of the spectrums evaluate parties almost as differently as voters 
at the complete opposite end of the ideological space. Suppose a party appeals 
mainly to wealthy, educated, migrants with predominantly European identities, 
which describes the elites often called “Eurostars” (Risse, 2010). A working class 
native (with a matching nationalist identity) would be expected to evaluate that 
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party roughly 4 units differently than the “Eurostar”  even if they described 
themselves the same ideologically).  
There is clearly more uncertainty associated with migrant background than 
with the other sociodemographic variables. Of course, to some extent this may 
simply reflect the fact that only 10% of respondents report that they or their 
parents were born abroad. And this isn’t necessarily cause for alarm: not all parties 
take stances of immigration. Further, not all countries in the European Union 
experience high levels of immigration; large immigrant populations are still 
concentrated in the Western, wealthier member states.  
Suppose one wished to evaluate this claim by comparing the degree of 
uncertainty in the original 15 member states (EU-15) with that found in the new 
member states. One way to see that this explanation does not hold is to partition the 
posterior density into EU-15 and new member states: 
 




Doing so reveals that there is actually a larger absolute effect of migrant background 
in the new member states. The model predicts an especially large effect of migrant 
background in Estonia and Latvia, and, to some extent, in Lithuania (all Baltic states 
with land borders to the outside of the EU). 
Another explanation may lie with type of party: immigrants tend to gravitate 
towards center-left parties in Europe in part because of the hostility of parties on 
the right and in part because of social policy (Messina, 2007). One way to evaluate 
this claim is to average posterior samples according to the party group in which the 
party sits in the European Parliament. (This time there is no need to evaluate 
absolute effects since we would expect parties which affiliate with one another to 
either be more appealing to migrants or natives in general.) Here there are clear 
findings consistent with the literature: as Table 3 below shows, other things being 
equal, there is an overwhelming chance that migrants find center or left parties 
more appealing while natives are more attracted to conservative parties. 
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Party Group Parties  









European People’s Party  EPP  40 -0.238 0.1% 
Party of European Socialists (PES) 30 0.142 95.7% 
Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) 18 0.441 100% 
Alliance of Liberal Democrats (ALDE) 35 0.088 87.6% 
European United Left-Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL) 13 0.332 99.6% 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 7 -0.072 33.6% 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 9 -0.021 44.1% 
(Not Affiliated) 51 0.0001 49.7% 
 
Table 3: Migrant vs. Native (Posterior) Party Group Preferences 
So, when viewed this way, the effects are clear but not particularly large in 
magnitude. This could offer some explanation as to why there is so much 
uncertainty at the party (as opposed to party group) level. 
A COMPARISON WITH SINGLE-LEVEL ORDINAL REGRESSION 
This section uses maximum likelihood estimation as the method for 
assessing the data and will use ordinal probit and logit to build models.  Ordinal 
probit or logit is appropriate when there are multiple, discrete categories where 
there is clear rank—for example, whether discrimination is “very widespread,” 
“fairly widespread,” “fairly rare,” or “very rare”—but where the difference between 
the categories cannot be assumed to be uniform  (Liao, 1994, p. 37ff). Rather than 
assuming that each choice represents a scalar value, we assume that there is a latent 
variable (y*) at work with its own probability distribution—typically, Gaussian or 
logistic—and that each choice corresponds to a portion of that pdf.  This means that 
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the responses must be transformed by a link function before they can be treated 
linearly.  We further assume the dependent variable y is explained by a structural 
component and a symmetrically distributed error term ε, such that: 
    ∑       
 
         
In the above equation, x represents a vector of (fixed) independent, explanatory 
variables  and β the corresponding vector of coefficients .   
We assume that there is a range of beliefs that corresponds to each discrete 
choice and use ordinal regression, logit or probit, to estimate the location of the 
boundaries between discrete choices.  μ represents an unknown threshold 
parameter that separates the j categories; this means: 
y    if y* ≤ μ ( =0)        
 = 2 if μ  ≤ y* ≤ μ   
 = 3 if μ   ≤ y* ≤  μ  
 : 
 : 
 = J if μ    ≤ y* 
 
If F is the cumulative distribution function of Y, then: 
                ∑       
 
         ∑      
 
                 
 
 I adapt the hierarchical model presented earlier to a single level model on the 
intuition that effects of the higher level of the model can be viewed as conditioning 
the outcome of effects at the lower level. Below, Table 4 presents maximum 
likelihood estimates of three ordered probit models. 16 Model 2 includes only spatial 
distance. Model 4 models interaction between distance and each of the 
                                                 
16 Estimated by polr() in the MASS library in R (Ripley, Venables, Bates, Hornik, Albrecht, & Firth, 2013).  
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sociodemographics. Model 3 serves mainly to facilitate comparison, as it includes 
the sociodemographics, but without interactions. 
 
Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Ordered Probit Models.  
Standard Errors and t-values in parentheses. SEs and t-values omitted for 
intercepts, but, with the exception of the boundary 4|5, which is not significant 




There are some changes to the model specifications worth noting. Models 3 
and 4 allow for the possibility that sociodemographics may have main effects.17 This 
means that these coefficients may be interpreted to reflect the extent to which a 
group receives higher utility on average from all parties in their country than other 
groups. (This, presumably, would translate into higher voter turnout for that 
group). Consistent with theories that the European voters often turn to radical right 
wing populism because of alienation with the mainstream political system (Givens, 
2005; Holmes, 2009; Simmons, 1996), the estimates do suggest that parties are 
generally more appealing to Europeanized (economic) elites than to working class 
nationalists. 
As Figure 8 shows, all three accurately reproduce the pattern of observed 
responses. This is a function, however, of the fact that ordinal categorical regression 
is equivalent to a series of binary regressions and so this is not sufficient to show 
accurate prediction. For each observation, I use the category with the highest 
probability as the prediction. Based on the same pseudo-R2 of squared correlation 
between the predicted and the observed, Model 4 (and only Model 4) shows clear 
improvement over Model 1: fit improves more than twofold from 0.25 to 0.669. 
                                                 
17 Since interactions between    and    are typically expressed by the regression equation           
       so that (focusing on the structural equation) the marginal effects (the partial derivatives) reflect both x 
variables, the model does allow for the possibility of main effects (   and   ) of the sociodemographics. 
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Figure 8: Probability Mass by Response Category 
Interactions are notoriously difficult to analyze for generalized linear models 
because the nonlinear relationship between the structural equation and the data 
implies a certain amount of interaction whether it is modeled or not (Berry, 
DeMeritt, & Esarey, 2010). Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey recommend evaluating 
likelihood ratio tests to see whether models that include a product term for 
interactions improve over ones that do not and assessing the substantive 
importance of the interaction. In this case, all four LR tests were highly significant (p 
< 0.0001). Much more importantly, only Model 4, which includes the interactions, is 
able to make accurate predictions. In fact, it is not possible to calculate the pseudo-
R2  for Models 2 and 3 because the predicted has a standard deviation of zero. 
Models 2 and 3 predict that every single respondent is most likely to respond zero, 
which is to say that it cannot distinguish individual attitudes towards particular 
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parties from the modal response. Modeling the interaction between 
sociodemographics and distance does shift the interpretation away somewhat from 
the idea advanced at the outset of this paper (namely, that different parties appeal 
more to the interests certain groups) and towards the related notion that ideology 




Chapter Six: Discussion 
 
 This paper has modeled support for political parties in the European Union 
beginning with the intuition that voters support ideologically proximate parties 
with two different approaches. Broadly, the findings here support the argument that 
there is a European “public sphere” (Risse, 2010) and that political ideology works 
in similar ways in the EU (Gschwend, Lo, & Proksch, 2012). This is not to say that 
there are no important differences across the EU, but rather that many of them can 
be explained by way of reference to characteristics of individuals or parties (as 
opposed to modeling countries as if they were explanatory factors). 
Both approaches account for individual heterogeneity arising from 
sociodemographic circumstance. Model 1, the hierarchical model, provides strong 
evidence that it is important to model party competence: for 203 different political 
parties, an average of over 94% of the posterior density suggested that the party 
intercept is not zero. Despite the large number of response categories, the 
dependent variable is clearly not normally distributed because of the large number 
of zeros. The ability of Model 1 to reproduce the data generating process suffers 
accordingly. 
Model 4 shows that party preference can be modeled parsimoniously by way 
of an interaction of ideology and sociodemographics. The interactions may not be 
necessary in the single country context, but Model 2 shows that ideology alone is 
insufficient is the multinational context. Put differently, the sociodemographics 
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perform something of a matching function in the model which suffices to make 
ideology commensurate across borders. For example, a working class person may 
interpret “left” more along the lines of social democracy whereas an elite may 
interpret “left” more along the lines of cosmopolitanism or environmentalism  and 
such trends seem to be consistent enough to overcome national idiosyncrasies). 
 Zero inflated models are common with count data, but have only recently 
been adapted to ordered categorical models (Harris & Zhao, 2007; Gurmu & Dagne, 
2012; Bagozzi & Mukherjee, 2012). They are a particular type of mixture 
distribution where a single observed outcome actually reflects more than one data 
generating processes. In this case, it might be helpful to model zero responses, in 
order to distinguish voters who would never consider supporting a party from those 
consider how likely they are to support it.18 However, absent a theory as to which 
variables affect which latent distribution, this simply doubles the number of 
parameters to be estimated, which may cause more problems than initial the 
violation of the Parallel Regression Assumption that zero inflation entails 
(particularly in the hierarchical context). Model 4 suggests that a reasonably well 
                                                 
18 According to Harris and Zhao (2007), if x is a set of variables determining whether to consider a 
party and z is a set of variables which is explains the extent of that support, and there are J categories, 
then  
Pr    {
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This violates the Parallel Regression Assumption that explanatory variables have homogenous effects 
across categories (that is, the latent boundaries imply different intercepts, but not different slopes) 
(Liao 1994) because the effect of z is mediated by the effect of x in different ways, depending on the 
response category. 
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specified ordered probit model can perform well even when the proportion of zeros 
is high. 
The weakness of Model 4 is that it is not grounded as tightly in spatial theory. 
The inclusion of different combinations of exogenous variables makes it difficult to 
assess the behavior of certain quantities of interest like the probability each party 
has maximized its vote share (Nash equilibriums). 
One seemingly natural extension would be to combine the best of both 
models and to fit a mixed effects model with an ordered categorical dependent 
variable. However, Bayesian ordered probit models are already notoriously slow to 
converge because of the difficulty of estimating the boundaries between latent 
categories (Jackman 2009, 401). In this case, a mere four sociodemographic 
variables translates into 812 party level parameters, which would seem to pose a 
serious challenge to samplers seeking to distinguish group effects from latent 
boundaries. Other options exist: glmer() in the R package lme4 can be used to 
estimate a series of hierarchical binary models via Restricted Maximum Likelihood 
and Greene and Henser (2009) propose a modeling the latent boundaries with 
structural hierarchical equations, but both of these approaches would seem difficult 
to interpret (particularly the latter). 
 All of this puts a very large premium on the accurate modeling of ideology. If 
ideology can be modeled as a distance term which is properly weighted to reflect 
the different concerns that different groups have, then the model can be simplified 
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tremendously to one where only the intercepts vary by party (to reflect 
competence). Jackman (2009, 410) shows how this can be implemented with an 
ordinal dependent variable; for weighted Euclidean distance, see (Lin, Enelow, & 
Dorussen, 1999; Hinich & Munger, 1997). To some extent, the strategies can be 
mixed and matched: if, for example, a researcher feels confident about modeling 
ideology for several groups (such as class) but not others (such as migrant 
background), then the former set can be built into the measurement of ideology 
while the latter can be modeled as having a group level effect. This would give a 
parsimonious representation of party support while allowing for detailed, party-by-




This table provides point estimates for party intercepts and effects of each 
sociodemographic variable on support for each party (based on Model 1).  Since 
party names have been shortened considerably for space, European Election Studies 
codes are listed beneath each party name. Credible intervals (95% HPDs) are 




Identity Education Class 
Migrant 
Background 
Austria Future -1.16 -0.367 -0.035 -0.051 0.013 
 
1040700 (-1.696, -0.616) (-0.606, -0.112) (-0.105, 0.034) (-0.29, 0.177) (-0.639, 0.713) 
 
 People's  2.046 0.167 -0.003 0.434 -0.22 
 
1040520 (1.498, 2.564) (-0.084, 0.402) (-0.074, 0.066) (0.196, 0.668) (-0.883, 0.466) 
 
 Communist  -2.144 0.247 0.071 -0.14 0.172 
 
1040220 (-2.665, -1.616) (0.003, 0.484) (0, 0.142) (-0.37, 0.098) (-0.469, 0.845) 
 
 Freedom   -0.522 -0.566 -0.173 0.113 -0.096 
 
1040720 (-1.047, 0) (-0.81, -0.319) (-0.244, -0.107) (-0.118, 0.35) (-0.759, 0.591) 
 
Martin's List  -0.491 -0.213 -0.163 -0.036 0.181 
 
1040951 (-1.02, 0.048) (-0.439, 0.041) (-0.232, -0.092) (-0.267, 0.195) (-0.503, 0.848) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.659 -0.125 -0.04 -0.165 0.744 
 
1040320 (1.091, 2.169) (-0.372, 0.122) (-0.113, 0.027) (-0.392, 0.075) (0.059, 1.393) 
 
 Greens  0.501 0.743 0.289 0.042 -0.287 
 
1040110 (-0.022, 1.046) (0.491, 0.988) (0.222, 0.361) (-0.185, 0.295) (-0.966, 0.349) 
 
 Young Liberal  -1.803 0.206 0.017 -0.045 0.147 
 
1040422 (-2.323, -1.267) (-0.041, 0.445) (-0.055, 0.088) (-0.278, 0.187) (-0.512, 0.834) 
       
Belgium 
 Christian Democrat & 
Flemish  
1.405 0.171 -0.083 0.382 0.26 
 
1056521 (0.898, 1.961) (-0.063, 0.388) (-0.148, -0.02) (0.171, 0.608) (-0.361, 0.852) 
 
 Flemish Interest  -0.855 -0.297 -0.098 0.088 -0.589 
 
1056711 (-1.364, -0.295) (-0.53, -0.071) (-0.166, -0.036) (-0.127, 0.31) (-1.195, 0.047) 
 
 Flemish Liberals & 
Democrats  
0.588 0.097 0.057 0.335 -0.444 
 
1056421 (0.057, 1.116) (-0.121, 0.34) (-0.006, 0.122) (0.13, 0.566) (-1.056, 0.134) 
 
 Green!  1.25 0.28 0.198 -0.185 0.614 
 
1056112 (0.709, 1.762) (0.054, 0.512) (0.135, 0.262) (-0.394, 0.036) (-0.003, 1.222) 
 
 List Dedecker  0.325 -0.03 0.09 -0.172 0.406 
 
1056600 (-0.2, 0.858) (-0.264, 0.192) (0.023, 0.15) (-0.393, 0.031) (-0.143, 1.041) 
 
 New Flemish   1.098 0.045 0.089 -0.088 -0.483 
 
1056913 (0.577, 1.628) (-0.181, 0.282) (0.027, 0.157) (-0.294, 0.132) (-1.084, 0.139) 
 
 Social Liberal  0.282 -0.086 0.084 -0.1 0.597 
 
1056328 (-0.226, 0.83) (-0.316, 0.133) (0.018, 0.146) (-0.307, 0.126) (-0.05, 1.159) 
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 Socialist Different  1.184 -0.046 0.031 -0.179 1.045 
 
1056327 (0.666, 1.727) (-0.269, 0.183) (-0.033, 0.097) (-0.391, 0.047) (0.472, 1.679) 
 
 Worker's  0.399 -0.051 0.072 -0.146 0.579 
 
1056222 (-0.119, 0.941) (-0.287, 0.168) (0.006, 0.134) (-0.361, 0.068) (-0.042, 1.193) 
       
Bulgaria  Blue Coalition (SDS-DSB)  -0.491 0.53 0.124 0.195 0.272 
 
1100001 (-1, 0.086) (0.268, 0.809) (0.054, 0.19) (-0.024, 0.404) (-0.835, 1.405) 
 
European Development  1.281 -0.262 -0.013 0.352 -0.23 
 
1100600 (0.734, 1.818) (-0.528, 0.011) (-0.079, 0.058) (0.142, 0.558) (-1.33, 0.858) 
 
 Coalition for Bulgaria  -0.133 -0.144 -0.045 -0.271 -0.332 
 
1100300 (-0.711, 0.396) (-0.411, 0.124) (-0.113, 0.024) (-0.497, -0.07) (-1.386, 0.785) 
 
 Movement for Rights  -2.301 0.581 -0.179 -0.018 0.061 
 
1100900 (-2.847, -1.748) (0.312, 0.856) (-0.249, -0.114) (-0.236, 0.194) (-1.058, 1.211) 
 
 NAPRED  -1.739 0.195 -0.001 0.122 0.393 
 
1100002 (-2.273, -1.2) (-0.088, 0.459) (-0.071, 0.065) (-0.08, 0.334) (-0.66, 1.535) 
 
 Stability & Progress  -1.464 0.474 0.002 0.345 -0.536 
 
1100400 (-1.978, -0.902) (0.212, 0.742) (-0.067, 0.072) (0.129, 0.559) (-1.639, 0.61) 
 
 National Union Attack  -1.297 -0.11 -0.055 0.296 -0.063 
 
1100700 (-1.825, -0.732) (-0.376, 0.17) (-0.122, 0.014) (0.075, 0.506) (-1.131, 1.052) 
 
 Order, Lawfulness & Justice  -1.206 0.113 0.003 0.113 0.19 
 
1100601 (-1.73, -0.656) (-0.158, 0.376) (-0.066, 0.069) (-0.112, 0.319) (-0.914, 1.26) 
       
Cyprus  Democrat  0.727 0.186 -0.102 0.207 -0.64 
 
1196422 (0.173, 1.246) (-0.051, 0.451) (-0.18, -0.025) (0.002, 0.401) (-1.592, 0.208) 
 
 Democratic Rally  1.563 0.425 -0.067 0.509 -0.152 
 
1196711 (1.043, 2.147) (0.178, 0.683) (-0.147, 0.011) (0.304, 0.704) (-1.069, 0.726) 
 
 Green  0.378 0.612 0.157 -0.074 0.57 
 
1196110 (-0.15, 0.932) (0.361, 0.864) (0.074, 0.232) (-0.27, 0.131) (-0.328, 1.478) 
 
 European  -0.4 0.233 0.07 0.137 0.478 
 
1196600 (-0.934, 0.151) (-0.01, 0.487) (-0.006, 0.152) (-0.073, 0.337) (-0.378, 1.439) 
 
 Social Democrat  0.43 0.101 0.029 -0.017 -0.22 
 
1196322 (-0.12, 0.955) (-0.152, 0.355) (-0.057, 0.103) (-0.219, 0.194) (-1.127, 0.673) 
 
 Progressive  1.743 -0.254 -0.114 -0.513 0.491 
 
1196321 (1.209, 2.299) (-0.509, -0.005) (-0.195, -0.036) (-0.714, -0.309) (-0.383, 1.436) 
Czech 
Republic 
 Christian Democrat  -0.407 -0.129 -0.031 -0.014 -0.149 
 
1203523 (-0.929, 0.134) (-0.396, 0.121) (-0.094, 0.024) (-0.207, 0.186) (-1.12, 0.848) 
 
 Civic Democrat  1.212 0.421 0.053 0.732 -0.049 
 
1203413 (0.676, 1.747) (0.157, 0.673) (-0.005, 0.11) (0.531, 0.923) (-1.018, 0.932) 
 
 Communist  -0.616 -0.198 -0.004 -0.379 0.459 
 
1203220 (-1.117, -0.051) (-0.455, 0.061) (-0.06, 0.057) (-0.58, -0.18) (-0.586, 1.409) 
 
 Social Democrat  0.889 -0.199 -0.02 -0.334 0.196 
 
1203320 (0.337, 1.404) (-0.447, 0.068) (-0.081, 0.034) (-0.524, -0.128) (-0.807, 1.156) 
 
 Green  -0.293 -0.033 -0.011 0.243 -0.442 
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1203110 (-0.833, 0.212) (-0.293, 0.226) (-0.068, 0.048) (0.04, 0.43) (-1.421, 0.519) 
       
Denmark  Conservative  -0.152 -0.052 0.029 0.695 -0.268 
 
1208620 (-0.709, 0.382) (-0.29, 0.193) (-0.009, 0.068) (0.496, 0.912) (-1.12, 0.568) 
 
 People's  0.306 -0.454 -0.131 -0.134 0.155 
 
1208720 (-0.247, 0.848) (-0.694, -0.197) (-0.169, -0.092) (-0.344, 0.079) (-0.714, 1) 
 
 Social Liberal  -0.749 0.273 0.068 0.223 0.864 
 
1208410 (-1.308, -0.191) (0.019, 0.524) (0.03, 0.107) (0.011, 0.432) (0.049, 1.736) 
 
 June -1.843 0.072 0.023 -0.211 0.16 
 
1208055 (-2.405, -1.301) (-0.165, 0.334) (-0.015, 0.062) (-0.416, -0.002) (-0.708, 0.989) 
 
 Liberal Alliance  -2.254 0.133 -0.005 0.187 0.266 
 
1208421 (-2.807, -1.709) (-0.109, 0.377) (-0.045, 0.032) (-0.029, 0.39) (-0.584, 1.089) 
 
 Liberal  0.894 -0.082 -0.068 0.745 -0.52 
 
1208420 (0.345, 1.437) (-0.33, 0.159) (-0.106, -0.028) (0.527, 0.952) (-1.377, 0.32) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.986 0.099 0.028 -0.606 0.638 
 
1208320 (1.438, 2.554) (-0.17, 0.336) (-0.014, 0.064) (-0.803, -0.399) (-0.17, 1.504) 
 
 Socialist  1.451 0.12 0.109 -0.546 0.67 
 
1208330 (0.917, 2.029) (-0.128, 0.365) (0.07, 0.148) (-0.754, -0.333) (-0.142, 1.519) 
       
Estonia  Centre  0.134 0.304 -0.149 -0.396 3.577 
 
1233411 (-0.386, 0.687) (0.056, 0.569) (-0.227, -0.064) (-0.603, -0.184) (3.048, 4.08) 
 
 Greens  0.695 -0.139 0.001 0.2 -1.232 
 
1233100 (0.143, 1.203) (-0.402, 0.121) (-0.08, 0.082) (-0.013, 0.41) (-1.75, -0.73) 
 
 Reform  0.487 0.111 0.001 0.737 -1.79 
 
1233430 (-0.031, 1.033) (-0.139, 0.38) (-0.08, 0.082) (0.53, 0.951) (-2.276, -1.264) 
 
 People's Union  -0.67 0.002 -0.143 0.146 -0.56 
 
1233612 (-1.192, -0.116) (-0.254, 0.271) (-0.228, -0.066) (-0.05, 0.368) (-1.07, -0.062) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.047 0.003 0.111 0.185 -1.618 
 
1233410 (0.531, 1.592) (-0.265, 0.264) (0.034, 0.193) (-0.02, 0.394) (-2.106, -1.046) 
 
 Pro Patria & Res Publica  0.76 -0.183 0.035 0.666 -2.253 
 
1233613 (0.2, 1.277) (-0.444, 0.064) (-0.05, 0.111) (0.459, 0.875) (-2.776, -1.755) 
       
Finland  Centre  0.784 -0.427 -0.05 0.326 -0.485 
 
1246810 (0.24, 1.325) (-0.696, -0.16) (-0.123, 0.023) (0.126, 0.539) (-1.628, 0.603) 
 
 Christian Democrat  -0.674 -0.027 0.004 0.126 -0.171 
 
1246520 (-1.223, -0.128) (-0.294, 0.237) (-0.07, 0.074) (-0.076, 0.348) (-1.336, 0.879) 
 
 Green  1.937 0.728 0.204 -0.311 0.84 
 
1246110 (1.396, 2.483) (0.458, 0.986) (0.129, 0.275) (-0.52, -0.098) (-0.311, 2.023) 
 
 Left   -0.375 0.288 0.035 -0.686 0.52 
 
1246223 (-0.936, 0.16) (0.031, 0.558) (-0.036, 0.109) (-0.894, -0.481) (-0.544, 1.703) 
 
 National Coalition  2.003 -0.087 0.126 1.07 -1.021 
 
1246620 (1.452, 2.546) (-0.344, 0.19) (0.056, 0.202) (0.867, 1.286) (-2.206, 0.139) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.184 -0.023 -0.006 -0.562 0.608 
 
1246320 (0.638, 1.737) (-0.282, 0.246) (-0.077, 0.067) (-0.787, -0.366) (-0.549, 1.767) 
 
 Swedish People's  -1.102 0.582 0.072 0.075 0.391 
 
1246901 (-1.631, -0.53) (0.311, 0.846) (0, 0.145) (-0.141, 0.268) (-0.778, 1.483) 
 
 True Finns  -0.096 -0.373 -0.169 -0.288 0.435 
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1246820 (-0.65, 0.448) (-0.645, -0.109) (-0.239, -0.094) (-0.508, -0.086) (-0.67, 1.58) 
       
France  Democrat -0.111 0.052 0.083 -0.072 0.475 
 
1250336 (-0.648, 0.415) (-0.203, 0.289) (0.015, 0.164) (-0.28, 0.119) (-0.222, 1.19) 
 
 New Anticapitalist & 
Workers' Struggle  
-0.82 0.056 0.019 -0.472 -0.23 
 
1250226 (-1.345, -0.293) (-0.181, 0.304) (-0.056, 0.092) (-0.67, -0.267) (-0.931, 0.512) 
 
 Communist  -0.906 0.106 -0.04 -0.49 0.486 
 
1250220 (-1.436, -0.388) (-0.136, 0.354) (-0.115, 0.031) (-0.679, -0.275) (-0.22, 1.212) 
 
 Left Party  0.087 0.083 -0.051 -0.416 0.848 
 
1250337 (-0.455, 0.61) (-0.151, 0.333) (-0.121, 0.025) (-0.617, -0.213) (0.169, 1.609) 
 
 National Front  -1.521 -0.225 -0.051 -0.155 -0.312 
 
1250720 (-2.05, -1.009) (-0.451, 0.031) (-0.126, 0.018) (-0.355, 0.046) (-1.053, 0.391) 
 
 Socialist  1.211 0.095 0.053 -0.313 0.804 
 
1250320 (0.677, 1.738) (-0.147, 0.341) (-0.02, 0.121) (-0.517, -0.113) (0.063, 1.498) 
 
 Greens  1.984 0.291 0.092 -0.134 0.014 
 
1250110 (1.465, 2.522) (0.05, 0.542) (0.02, 0.164) (-0.333, 0.07) (-0.685, 0.752) 
 
 Popular (UMP) 1.032 0.107 -0.104 0.728 0.206 
 
1250626 (0.53, 1.591) (-0.134, 0.359) (-0.174, -0.028) (0.537, 0.942) (-0.471, 0.917) 
       
Germany  Alliance '90 + Greens  0.819 0.437 0.208 0.088 0.02 
 
1276113 (0.29, 1.379) (0.214, 0.661) (0.124, 0.295) (-0.123, 0.311) (-0.593, 0.669) 
 
 Christian Democrat  1.866 -0.16 -0.112 0.945 0.001 
 
1276521 (1.344, 2.431) (-0.378, 0.067) (-0.202, -0.023) (0.724, 1.152) (-0.619, 0.637) 
 
 Free Democrat  0.474 -0.086 -0.026 0.659 0.206 
 
1276420 (-0.052, 1.047) (-0.31, 0.133) (-0.115, 0.059) (0.44, 0.873) (-0.389, 0.845) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.447 0.103 -0.015 -0.035 0.398 
 
1276320 (0.924, 2.03) (-0.108, 0.336) (-0.106, 0.069) (-0.239, 0.19) (-0.221, 1.016) 
 
 Left  -1.035 0.292 0.145 -0.471 0.063 
 
1276321 (-1.583, -0.502) (0.084, 0.522) (0.061, 0.232) (-0.694, -0.266) (-0.566, 0.674) 
       
Greece  Radical Left  -0.567 0.411 0.108 -0.264 0.001 
 
1300215 (-1.077, -0.031) (0.149, 0.677) (0.036, 0.181) (-0.465, -0.066) (-0.917, 0.858) 
 
 Communist  -0.141 -0.005 0.01 -0.335 -0.14 
 
1300210 (-0.652, 0.386) (-0.272, 0.25) (-0.062, 0.082) (-0.532, -0.135) (-1.025, 0.749) 
 
 Greens  -0.101 0.098 0.054 0.039 -0.06 
 
1300116 (-0.64, 0.423) (-0.154, 0.368) (-0.02, 0.13) (-0.168, 0.238) (-0.959, 0.804) 
 
 New Democracy  0.503 -0.264 -0.121 0.557 -0.247 
 
1300511 (-0.036, 1.01) (-0.532, -0.007) (-0.192, -0.047) (0.366, 0.753) (-1.12, 0.623) 
 
 Socialist  0.88 -0.116 -0.133 -0.102 -0.496 
 
1300313 (0.342, 1.393) (-0.375, 0.143) (-0.203, -0.057) (-0.305, 0.099) (-1.39, 0.346) 
 
 Popular Orthodox  -0.79 -0.257 -0.066 0.077 0.316 
 
1300703 (-1.318, -0.27) (-0.516, 0.008) (-0.143, 0.004) (-0.127, 0.27) (-0.615, 1.16) 
       
Hungary  Free Democrats  -1.402 0.189 0.017 0.16 0.104 
 
1348422 (-1.955, -0.837) (-0.117, 0.446) (-0.046, 0.08) (-0.077, 0.384) (-0.719, 1.03) 
 
 Christian Democrat  0 -0.023 -0.026 0.324 0.647 
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1348526 (-0.54, 0.581) (-0.308, 0.266) (-0.086, 0.038) (0.092, 0.558) (-0.216, 1.525) 
 
 Fidesz-Hungarian  2.799 -0.152 -0.11 -0.055 0.548 
 
1348421 (2.239, 3.356) (-0.457, 0.109) (-0.168, -0.043) (-0.281, 0.187) (-0.287, 1.451) 
 
 Communist   -1.672 0.083 -0.028 -0.014 -0.057 
 
1348210 (-2.229, -1.128) (-0.199, 0.35) (-0.09, 0.036) (-0.257, 0.208) (-0.894, 0.867) 
 
 Democratic Forum  -1.044 0.185 0.057 0.036 0.143 
 
1348521 (-1.588, -0.494) (-0.094, 0.464) (-0.008, 0.116) (-0.208, 0.26) (-0.704, 0.989) 
 
 Socialist  -0.207 0.305 0.027 0.087 0.097 
 
1348220 (-0.735, 0.352) (0.022, 0.577) (-0.033, 0.092) (-0.147, 0.323) (-0.744, 0.965) 
 
 Better Hungary  0.171 -0.182 0.008 0.096 -0.162 
 
1348700 (-0.395, 0.706) (-0.451, 0.099) (-0.054, 0.072) (-0.144, 0.324) (-1.01, 0.714) 
       
Ireland  Fiann Fail  0.27 -0.117 -0.05 0.226 0.069 
 
1372620 (-0.237, 0.817) (-0.343, 0.13) (-0.127, 0.021) (0.018, 0.436) (-0.596, 0.719) 
 
 Fine Gael  2.17 -0.032 0.079 0.378 -1.022 
 
1372520 (1.648, 2.71) (-0.264, 0.2) (0.01, 0.151) (0.158, 0.583) (-1.683, -0.33) 
 
 Green  0.285 0.142 0.14 0.014 0.199 
 
1372110 (-0.232, 0.815) (-0.1, 0.371) (0.07, 0.217) (-0.192, 0.22) (-0.465, 0.885) 
 
 Labour  2.207 0.22 0.048 -0.291 -0.128 
 
1372320 (1.703, 2.762) (-0.027, 0.451) (-0.029, 0.119) (-0.497, -0.087) (-0.77, 0.555) 
 
 Libertas  -1.173 -0.096 -0.03 -0.311 0.583 
 
1372001 (-1.7, -0.638) (-0.34, 0.139) (-0.1, 0.047) (-0.52, -0.099) (-0.082, 1.24) 
 
 Sinn Fein  -0.469 -0.13 -0.178 -0.407 0.479 
 
1372951 (-0.982, 0.083) (-0.383, 0.093) (-0.251, -0.109) (-0.621, -0.2) (-0.161, 1.148) 
       
Italy  Communist Refoundation  -0.398 0.097 -0.014 -0.147 0.683 
 
1380212 (-0.935, 0.138) (-0.135, 0.339) (-0.085, 0.053) (-0.378, 0.066) (-0.352, 1.767) 
 
 Democrat  1.223 0.322 0.104 -0.18 -0.666 
 
1380331 (0.699, 1.773) (0.074, 0.554) (0.033, 0.173) (-0.405, 0.059) (-1.698, 0.427) 
 
 Italy of Values  0.491 0.286 0.039 -0.315 0.647 
 
1380902 (-0.04, 1.039) (0.041, 0.521) (-0.028, 0.107) (-0.533, -0.076) (-0.375, 1.741) 
 
 Left & Freedom  -0.186 0.158 0.042 -0.174 0.03 
 
1380007 (-0.72, 0.368) (-0.075, 0.387) (-0.028, 0.111) (-0.412, 0.037) (-0.974, 1.13) 
 
 Northern League  0.267 -0.251 -0.077 0.127 0.215 
 
1380720 (-0.298, 0.794) (-0.491, -0.017) (-0.148, -0.009) (-0.108, 0.349) (-0.828, 1.27) 
 
 People of Freedom  1.298 -0.437 -0.032 0.351 -0.026 
 
1380630 (0.772, 1.842) (-0.675, -0.204) (-0.105, 0.035) (0.121, 0.577) (-1.113, 0.991) 
 
 Right  -0.315 -0.063 -0.12 0.151 -0.099 
 
1380631 (-0.89, 0.189) (-0.306, 0.173) (-0.189, -0.05) (-0.087, 0.378) (-1.121, 1.017) 
 
 Christian &  Centre 
Democrats  
-0.408 0.026 -0.042 0.177 -0.183 
 
1380523 (-0.926, 0.139) (-0.193, 0.28) (-0.111, 0.025) (-0.035, 0.427) (-1.248, 0.859) 
       
Latvia  Civic Union  0.338 -0.139 -0.014 0.024 -1.35 
 
1428611 (-0.204, 0.878) (-0.418, 0.118) (-0.112, 0.078) (-0.174, 0.229) (-1.943, -0.756) 
 
 Fatherland & Freedom  -0.649 -0.204 -0.03 0.19 -1.471 
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1428723 (-1.208, -0.112) (-0.475, 0.064) (-0.124, 0.068) (-0.016, 0.396) (-2.039, -0.881) 
 
 Human Rights -1.041 0.048 -0.102 0.107 1.409 
 
1428422 (-1.603, -0.49) (-0.218, 0.32) (-0.199, -0.008) (-0.086, 0.322) (0.794, 1.952) 
 
 Harmony Centre  0.339 0.387 -0.118 -0.251 2.868 
 
1428317 (-0.193, 0.9) (0.129, 0.671) (-0.221, -0.031) (-0.453, -0.048) (2.259, 3.435) 
 
 Latvian Way  -0.613 0.438 -0.101 0.398 0.578 
 
1428424 (-1.152, -0.059) (0.18, 0.715) (-0.202, -0.013) (0.206, 0.605) (-0.026, 1.152) 
 
 New Era  0.053 -0.206 -0.042 0.472 -1.422 
 
1428423 (-0.513, 0.613) (-0.486, 0.045) (-0.135, 0.055) (0.261, 0.673) (-2.017, -0.86) 
 
 People's  -1.608 -0.121 -0.136 0.282 -0.447 
 
1428610 (-2.158, -1.059) (-0.377, 0.154) (-0.229, -0.037) (0.074, 0.488) (-1.032, 0.126) 
 
 Society for Other Politics  -0.168 -0.324 -0.037 0.345 -0.83 
 
1428425 (-0.713, 0.37) (-0.588, -0.066) (-0.13, 0.063) (0.131, 0.55) (-1.399, -0.256) 
 
 Green & Farmers  -0.259 -0.403 -0.135 0.387 -0.906 
 
1428110 (-0.79, 0.329) (-0.665, -0.129) (-0.235, -0.042) (0.185, 0.592) (-1.505, -0.328) 
       
Lithuania  Lithuania's Poles  -1.7 0.089 -0.064 0.008 0.983 
 
1440952 (-2.24, -1.155) (-0.208, 0.386) (-0.133, 0.004) (-0.184, 0.213) (0.088, 1.914) 
 
 Christian Democrat  0.8 0.238 0.003 0.563 -1.293 
 
1440620 (0.254, 1.339) (-0.056, 0.54) (-0.062, 0.073) (0.361, 0.766) (-2.247, -0.407) 
 
 Labour  0.359 -0.307 -0.137 0.116 0.453 
 
1440322 (-0.161, 0.909) (-0.591, -0.011) (-0.202, -0.066) (-0.084, 0.319) (-0.502, 1.328) 
 
 Liberal & Centre  -0.324 0.161 0.046 0.244 0.302 
 
1440420 (-0.853, 0.213) (-0.121, 0.448) (-0.02, 0.114) (0.042, 0.43) (-0.598, 1.234) 
 
 Liberals' Movement  -0.189 0.393 0.087 0.171 -0.347 
 
1440421 (-0.719, 0.359) (0.069, 0.667) (0.018, 0.151) (-0.017, 0.387) (-1.226, 0.585) 
 
 Peasant Popular -0.679 -0.208 -0.086 -0.05 0.296 
 
1440824 (-1.231, -0.131) (-0.51, 0.076) (-0.152, -0.017) (-0.253, 0.145) (-0.604, 1.273) 
 
 National Resurrection  -1.459 -0.127 -0.086 0.315 -0.418 
 
1440001 (-1.986, -0.894) (-0.408, 0.194) (-0.151, -0.015) (0.111, 0.515) (-1.292, 0.538) 
 
Social Liberals  -0.513 -0.074 -0.058 0.108 -0.156 
 
1440410 (-1.073, 0.013) (-0.357, 0.216) (-0.128, 0.01) (-0.092, 0.311) (-1.078, 0.752) 
 
 Order & Justice  0.267 -0.394 -0.145 -0.124 0.31 
 
1440021 (-0.263, 0.818) (-0.666, -0.092) (-0.213, -0.079) (-0.325, 0.081) (-0.6, 1.204) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.08 -0.17 -0.044 0.128 -0.208 
 
1440320 (0.531, 1.621) (-0.459, 0.13) (-0.106, 0.027) (-0.074, 0.332) (-1.167, 0.694) 
       
Luxembourg 
 Alternative Democratic 
Reform  
-1.234 -0.145 -0.064 -0.031 0.739 
 
1442951 (-1.789, -0.705) (-0.369, 0.059) (-0.098, -0.033) (-0.256, 0.202) (0.29, 1.211) 
 
 Christian Social  3.363 -0.282 -0.009 0.321 -0.582 
 
1442520 (2.782, 3.906) (-0.487, -0.061) (-0.044, 0.022) (0.081, 0.546) (-1.043, -0.093) 
 
 Citizens' List  -2.047 0.076 -0.04 -0.088 0.535 
 
1442009 (-2.609, -1.47) (-0.134, 0.292) (-0.074, -0.007) (-0.32, 0.15) (0.06, 1.01) 
 
 Communist  -1.873 -0.016 -0.021 -0.135 0.541 
 
1442220 (-2.438, -1.332) (-0.228, 0.199) (-0.054, 0.012) (-0.371, 0.089) (0.064, 1.016) 
 
 Democrat  0.786 -0.083 0.033 0.32 -0.538 
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1442420 (0.243, 1.359) (-0.293, 0.144) (0, 0.067) (0.084, 0.556) (-1.013, -0.068) 
 
 Socialist  2.249 -0.005 -0.029 0.164 -0.966 
 
1442320 (1.688, 2.815) (-0.218, 0.212) (-0.062, 0.004) (-0.068, 0.39) (-1.456, -0.491) 
 
 Greens  1.082 0.182 0.063 0.393 -0.581 
 
1442113 (0.557, 1.674) (-0.029, 0.398) (0.03, 0.096) (0.165, 0.621) (-1.06, -0.112) 
 
 Left  -0.978 0.094 0.013 -0.21 -0.057 
 
1442222 (-1.528, -0.406) (-0.119, 0.311) (-0.021, 0.046) (-0.456, 0.016) (-0.553, 0.387) 
       
Malta  Democratic Alternative  0.093 0.28 0.344 0.125 1.115 
 
1470100 (-0.573, 0.714) (-0.005, 0.547) (0.216, 0.465) (-0.072, 0.333) (0.215, 2.029) 
 
 Labour  2.081 -0.429 -0.096 -0.81 0.038 
 
1470300 (1.435, 2.726) (-0.7, -0.151) (-0.217, 0.032) (-1.009, -0.611) (-0.866, 0.979) 
 
 National Action  -1.585 -0.039 0.12 -0.004 0.272 
 
1470700 (-2.222, -0.947) (-0.315, 0.226) (-0.011, 0.245) (-0.208, 0.198) (-0.652, 1.162) 
 
 Nationalist  2.585 0.736 0.197 0.771 0.747 
 
1470500 (1.91, 3.188) (0.468, 1.022) (0.069, 0.32) (0.574, 0.981) (-0.21, 1.673) 
       
Netherlands  Christian Democrat  1.341 0.025 -0.063 0.342 -0.535 
 
1528521 (0.81, 1.897) (-0.201, 0.244) (-0.122, -0.011) (0.142, 0.547) (-1.345, 0.31) 
 
 Christian Union  -0.484 -0.077 -0.07 0.045 0.237 
 
1528526 (-1.038, 0.045) (-0.283, 0.158) (-0.125, -0.011) (-0.167, 0.244) (-0.625, 1.036) 
 
 Democrats '66  1.316 0.33 0.158 0.268 -0.005 
 
1528330 (0.761, 1.849) (0.114, 0.56) (0.098, 0.211) (0.058, 0.467) (-0.876, 0.793) 
 
 Green Left  1.158 0.376 0.18 -0.271 0.524 
 
1528110 (0.616, 1.721) (0.152, 0.593) (0.126, 0.24) (-0.469, -0.053) (-0.308, 1.351) 
 
 Labour  1.517 0.32 0.079 -0.281 0.731 
 
1528320 (0.962, 2.054) (0.104, 0.545) (0.026, 0.137) (-0.482, -0.075) (-0.143, 1.53) 
 
 Animals  -0.289 0.095 -0.061 -0.452 0.687 
 
1528006 (-0.836, 0.249) (-0.136, 0.31) (-0.119, -0.007) (-0.666, -0.253) (-0.145, 1.502) 
 
 Freedom   -0.524 -0.235 -0.125 -0.201 0.668 
 
1528600 (-1.055, 0.047) (-0.454, -0.017) (-0.181, -0.071) (-0.413, 0.002) (-0.16, 1.477) 
 
 People's  0.54 -0.048 -0.019 0.662 -0.287 
 
1528420 (0.032, 1.114) (-0.281, 0.166) (-0.076, 0.034) (0.455, 0.866) (-1.072, 0.55) 
 
 Proud of Netherlands  -1.434 -0.094 -0.109 0.037 -0.031 
 
1528726 (-1.981, -0.897) (-0.317, 0.128) (-0.168, -0.051) (-0.166, 0.255) (-0.879, 0.768) 
 
 Reformed Political Party  -1.258 -0.115 -0.09 -0.071 0.216 
 
1528527 (-1.827, -0.746) (-0.342, 0.106) (-0.145, -0.032) (-0.273, 0.141) (-0.581, 1.036) 
 
 Socialist  0.85 0.144 0.077 -0.573 0.36 
 
1528220 (0.312, 1.394) (-0.073, 0.371) (0.023, 0.136) (-0.784, -0.366) (-0.471, 1.199) 
       
Poland  Civic Platform  1.56 0.67 0.134 0.369 -0.418 
 
1616435 (1.029, 2.1) (0.378, 0.972) (0.067, 0.201) (0.141, 0.578) (-1.515, 0.64) 
 
 CenterLeft Coalition  -1.487 0.097 0.008 0.095 0.444 
 
1616011 (-2.02, -0.967) (-0.187, 0.387) (-0.059, 0.075) (-0.118, 0.308) (-0.594, 1.445) 
 
 Democratic Left   -0.133 0.202 0.055 0.094 0.363 
 
1616210 (-0.643, 0.419) (-0.097, 0.478) (-0.013, 0.118) (-0.111, 0.316) (-0.703, 1.44) 
 
 Law & Justice  -0.091 -0.413 -0.042 -0.221 -0.16 
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1616436 (-0.633, 0.427) (-0.688, -0.123) (-0.107, 0.022) (-0.442, 0.003) (-1.224, 0.909) 
 
 Libertas  -1.998 0.145 -0.04 -0.001 -0.156 
 
1616010 (-2.54, -1.484) (-0.132, 0.443) (-0.103, 0.027) (-0.21, 0.218) (-1.266, 0.849) 
 
People's  -0.583 -0.169 -0.093 -0.023 -0.031 
 
1616811 (-1.12, -0.078) (-0.457, 0.112) (-0.162, -0.029) (-0.243, 0.185) (-1.088, 1.039) 
       
Portugal  People's  0.061 -0.19 0.095 0.077 -0.012 
 
1620314 (-0.465, 0.633) (-0.483, 0.061) (0.007, 0.182) (-0.147, 0.316) (-1.122, 1.077) 
 
 Democratic Union 
(Communist + Green)  
-0.403 0.135 0.089 -0.505 0.237 
 
1620229 (-0.976, 0.133) (-0.15, 0.4) (0, 0.174) (-0.729, -0.295) (-0.866, 1.296) 
 
 Left Bloc  0.89 0.157 0.312 -0.373 0.103 
 
1620211 (0.346, 1.469) (-0.123, 0.432) (0.225, 0.4) (-0.601, -0.148) (-1.002, 1.227) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.684 -0.162 0.016 0.268 0.623 
 
1620313 (1.127, 2.222) (-0.425, 0.112) (-0.07, 0.101) (0.034, 0.486) (-0.506, 1.707) 
 
 Socialist  0.664 0.265 -0.095 0.016 0.12 
 
1620311 (0.115, 1.227) (-0.01, 0.528) (-0.181, -0.009) (-0.2, 0.24) (-0.95, 1.284) 
       
Romania 
 Christian Democratic 
National Peasants  
-1.346 0.238 -0.02 0.107 0.222 
 
1642800 (-1.87, -0.795) (-0.016, 0.496) (-0.073, 0.037) (-0.088, 0.32) (-0.895, 1.37) 
 
 Conservative  -1.114 0.113 0.009 0.238 -0.092 
 
1642600 (-1.615, -0.536) (-0.142, 0.369) (-0.043, 0.066) (0.031, 0.438) (-1.251, 1.01) 
 
 Democratic Liberal  1.04 -0.059 -0.013 0.407 0.441 
 
1642400 (0.498, 1.589) (-0.309, 0.211) (-0.07, 0.041) (0.215, 0.618) (-0.668, 1.586) 
 
 Hungarians in Romania  -1.007 1.144 -0.103 0.185 0.681 
 
1642900 (-1.563, -0.468) (0.875, 1.391) (-0.16, -0.049) (-0.01, 0.395) (-0.488, 1.794) 
 
 Greater Romania  -0.309 -0.044 -0.083 0.106 -0.407 
 
1642700 (-0.83, 0.255) (-0.316, 0.2) (-0.136, -0.026) (-0.1, 0.306) (-1.579, 0.677) 
 
 National Liberal  0.26 0.401 0.049 0.327 0.322 
 
1642401 (-0.275, 0.798) (0.146, 0.658) (-0.006, 0.104) (0.126, 0.533) (-0.832, 1.448) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.305 0.027 -0.102 0.086 -0.494 
 
1642300 (0.753, 1.861) (-0.238, 0.282) (-0.158, -0.049) (-0.128, 0.281) (-1.668, 0.617) 
       
Slovakia  Christian Democrat  -0.643 0.067 -0.035 0.206 -0.537 
 
1703521 (-1.174, -0.122) (-0.156, 0.298) (-0.109, 0.037) (-0.02, 0.426) (-1.398, 0.419) 
 
 Communist  -1.464 -0.098 -0.041 -0.147 -0.353 
 
1703222 (-1.973, -0.934) (-0.334, 0.115) (-0.113, 0.032) (-0.375, 0.077) (-1.298, 0.519) 
 
 Social Democrat  2.062 -0.665 -0.171 -0.015 0.238 
 
1703423 (1.541, 2.587) (-0.895, -0.437) (-0.242, -0.097) (-0.25, 0.197) (-0.68, 1.132) 
 
 Free Forum  -1.203 -0.001 0.027 -0.109 -0.602 
 
1703524 (-1.695, -0.633) (-0.229, 0.222) (-0.041, 0.102) (-0.334, 0.11) (-1.478, 0.298) 
 
 People's  -1.238 -0.265 -0.113 0.045 -0.629 
 
1703711 (-1.774, -0.709) (-0.483, -0.03) (-0.181, -0.04) (-0.194, 0.265) (-1.463, 0.35) 
 
 Democratic & Christian 
Union  
0.307 0.306 0.209 0.326 -0.349 
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1703523 (-0.221, 0.833) (0.07, 0.522) (0.139, 0.282) (0.08, 0.543) (-1.255, 0.55) 
 
 National  -0.475 -0.469 -0.073 -0.114 -0.613 
 
1703710 (-0.998, 0.071) (-0.688, -0.236) (-0.144, 0.004) (-0.336, 0.125) (-1.553, 0.28) 
 
 SMK  -1.467 0.782 -0.086 0.005 0.06 
 
1703954 (-1.966, -0.904) (0.552, 1.023) (-0.16, -0.015) (-0.226, 0.234) (-0.896, 0.927) 
       
Slovenia  Pensioners'  -0.581 -0.269 -0.351 -0.004 0.069 
 
1705951 (-1.148, 0.098) (-0.511, -0.011) (-0.486, -0.209) (-0.207, 0.218) (-0.688, 0.882) 
 
 For Real  1.064 0.09 0.186 0.248 0.039 
 
1705324 (0.389, 1.638) (-0.159, 0.341) (0.045, 0.325) (0.024, 0.451) (-0.802, 0.796) 
 
 Liberal Democracy  0.661 0.059 0.098 0.186 0.42 
 
1705421 (0.025, 1.269) (-0.183, 0.31) (-0.041, 0.235) (-0.019, 0.408) (-0.389, 1.199) 
 
 Christian People's  -0.972 0.255 -0.236 0.257 -1.045 
 
1705522 (-1.618, -0.392) (0.022, 0.516) (-0.37, -0.089) (0.047, 0.467) (-1.785, -0.223) 
 
 Democrat  0.39 0.071 -0.366 0.218 -1.02 
 
1705320 (-0.242, 0.978) (-0.172, 0.318) (-0.514, -0.232) (0.011, 0.425) (-1.802, -0.215) 
 
 National  -0.975 -0.236 -0.356 0.051 -0.561 
 
1705710 (-1.595, -0.373) (-0.486, 0.015) (-0.501, -0.223) (-0.158, 0.265) (-1.378, 0.216) 
 
 People's  -0.859 -0.056 -0.199 0.131 -0.823 
 
1705521 (-1.444, -0.22) (-0.302, 0.182) (-0.349, -0.06) (-0.067, 0.36) (-1.608, -0.044) 
 
 Social Democrat  2.19 0.035 0.158 0.159 -0.255 
 
1705323 (1.572, 2.805) (-0.211, 0.284) (0.016, 0.293) (-0.048, 0.364) (-1.102, 0.523) 
 
 Youth  -0.485 0.119 -0.167 -0.061 0.2 
 
1705952 (-1.109, 0.121) (-0.136, 0.354) (-0.304, -0.028) (-0.275, 0.146) (-0.605, 1.002) 
       
Spain  Basque Nationalist  -2.116 0.407 -0.016 -0.112 0.147 
 
1724902 (-2.661, -1.584) (0.154, 0.665) (-0.057, 0.028) (-0.304, 0.102) (-0.807, 1.132) 
 
 Basque Social Democracy  -2.362 0.369 -0.018 -0.124 0.504 
 
1724903 (-2.889, -1.828) (0.117, 0.629) (-0.06, 0.028) (-0.335, 0.084) (-0.507, 1.441) 
 
 Canarian  -2.083 0.095 -0.047 -0.082 -0.04 
 
1724907 (-2.613, -1.535) (-0.156, 0.347) (-0.089, -0.006) (-0.296, 0.119) (-0.972, 1.011) 
 
 Convergence & Union  -1.639 0.553 -0.03 -0.185 -0.263 
 
1724007 (-2.178, -1.107) (0.302, 0.818) (-0.072, 0.014) (-0.389, 0.026) (-1.205, 0.732) 
 
 Galician Nationalist  -2.06 0.095 -0.018 -0.09 -0.232 
 
1724908 (-2.592, -1.525) (-0.175, 0.326) (-0.06, 0.027) (-0.309, 0.116) (-1.221, 0.741) 
 
 Navarre Yes  -2.357 0.249 -0.008 -0.114 0.244 
 
1724923 (-2.877, -1.796) (-0.004, 0.509) (-0.05, 0.035) (-0.318, 0.096) (-0.732, 1.185) 
 
 Navarrese People's -2.279 -0.001 -0.025 0.001 0.371 
 
1724922 (-2.793, -1.712) (-0.268, 0.24) (-0.069, 0.017) (-0.207, 0.205) (-0.589, 1.308) 
 
 People's  1.794 -0.593 -0.026 0.424 0.265 
 
1724610 (1.258, 2.328) (-0.834, -0.326) (-0.069, 0.016) (0.214, 0.625) (-0.737, 1.216) 
 
 Republican Left of Catalonia  -1.941 0.447 -0.015 -0.05 0.212 
 
1724905 (-2.483, -1.418) (0.191, 0.704) (-0.058, 0.027) (-0.247, 0.167) (-0.699, 1.201) 
 
 Socialist Workers  1.447 -0.066 -0.039 -0.229 0.656 
 
1724320 (0.912, 2.007) (-0.313, 0.187) (-0.081, 0.003) (-0.431, -0.025) (-0.349, 1.584) 
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 Union, Progress -0.148 -0.019 0.051 0.021 -0.244 
 
1724010 (-0.698, 0.385) (-0.26, 0.245) (0.008, 0.093) (-0.181, 0.232) (-1.178, 0.684) 
 
 United Left  -0.354 0.512 0.017 -0.367 -0.231 
 
1724220 (-0.89, 0.2) (0.253, 0.765) (-0.026, 0.059) (-0.578, -0.162) (-1.195, 0.704) 
       
Sweden  Centre  -0.131 0.047 0.034 0.276 -0.197 
 
1752810 (-0.656, 0.408) (-0.192, 0.296) (-0.055, 0.121) (0.067, 0.476) (-0.888, 0.476) 
 
 Christian  -0.608 0.171 -0.018 0.286 -0.371 
 
1752520 (-1.104, -0.054) (-0.076, 0.416) (-0.104, 0.071) (0.08, 0.484) (-1.072, 0.273) 
 
 Green  1.204 0.21 0.212 -0.359 0.695 
 
1752110 (0.67, 1.739) (-0.025, 0.468) (0.124, 0.297) (-0.566, -0.156) (0.007, 1.357) 
 
 Left  0.046 0.188 0.126 -0.75 0.577 
 
1752220 (-0.46, 0.593) (-0.05, 0.448) (0.039, 0.21) (-0.952, -0.53) (-0.1, 1.233) 
 
 Liberal  0.583 0.274 0.164 0.799 -0.119 
 
1752420 (0.062, 1.12) (0.022, 0.509) (0.074, 0.251) (0.602, 1.01) (-0.806, 0.53) 
 
 Moderate  1.239 0.108 0.011 1.309 -0.895 
 
1752620 (0.715, 1.772) (-0.143, 0.355) (-0.073, 0.103) (1.107, 1.523) (-1.59, -0.25) 
 
 Social Democrat  1.709 -0.148 -0.123 -0.971 0.474 
 
1752320 (1.174, 2.233) (-0.395, 0.1) (-0.207, -0.031) (-1.189, -0.775) (-0.208, 1.155) 
 
 Democrats  -2.007 0.049 -0.068 0.005 0.561 
 
1752700 (-2.524, -1.455) (-0.192, 0.304) (-0.159, 0.017) (-0.185, 0.223) (-0.14, 1.224) 
       
United 
Kingdom 
 British National -1.593 -0.092 -0.1 0.079 0.058 
 
1826720 (-2.134, -1.051) (-0.349, 0.165) (-0.151, -0.046) (-0.116, 0.287) (-0.668, 0.777) 
 
 Conservative  1.655 -0.557 -0.003 0.741 -0.19 
 
1826620 (1.146, 2.231) (-0.8, -0.291) (-0.057, 0.047) (0.545, 0.943) (-0.908, 0.511) 
 
 Green  0.208 0.371 0.071 -0.191 0.394 
 
1826110 (-0.352, 0.726) (0.107, 0.629) (0.021, 0.123) (-0.39, 0.015) (-0.298, 1.105) 
 
 Labour  0.654 0.408 0.119 -0.432 0.716 
 
1826320 (0.128, 1.189) (0.168, 0.679) (0.064, 0.169) (-0.636, -0.226) (0.037, 1.449) 
 
 Liberal Democrat  1.022 0.294 0.097 0.265 0.028 
 
1826421 (0.488, 1.578) (0.04, 0.555) (0.04, 0.148) (0.064, 0.458) (-0.667, 0.757) 
 
 Plaid Cymru  -2.257 0.124 -0.062 0.078 0.448 
 
1826901 (-2.796, -1.708) (-0.123, 0.402) (-0.116, -0.011) (-0.115, 0.293) (-0.268, 1.167) 
 
 Scottish National  -1.921 0.081 -0.059 -0.094 0.844 
 
1826902 (-2.497, -1.403) (-0.187, 0.326) (-0.113, -0.006) (-0.297, 0.111) (0.107, 1.572) 
 
 Independence  -0.413 -0.346 -0.105 -0.068 0.164 
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